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Unable to imagine a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, Germany either opposed deterrence as a hurdle for dialogue or ignored the balance of power altogether. Over the years, Berlin forged a number of agreements, formulas, and formats it believed would appease and satiate Putin.
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For far too long, the German political class prided itself for its supposedly patient, even-keeled approach toward Moscow that rose above what it saw as the unrefined fears and passions of its Eastern European allies. Putin has long viewed Germany as ripe for exploitation. The implications for Ukraine are dire: Russian President Vladimir Putin may not have won the war, but he may yet win the peace-especially if Scholz teams up with French President Emmanuel Macron, who has been pushing for an end to the war at terms favorable enough to Putin that he is spared any “ humiliation.” To that end, Scholz and Macron will travel to Kyiv this week with Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi and Romanian President Klaus Iohannis. In effect, Scholz has attempted to substitute spending for leadership. As a Social Democrat, his inclination since his uncharacteristically bold speech has been to try to manage, rather than confront, Russia. As a former finance minister, Scholz’s initial reflex after learning of the Russian invasion was to flood the zone with money, including a 100 billion euro ($108 billion) fund to bolster Germany’s armed forces. His skills served Scholz well in the campaign, but they have proved a liability during a major European war. Lacking experience in geopolitics, Scholz promised little new in foreign policy. In other words, he sold himself as another version of his predecessor, Angela Merkel, who was known for her understated style and technocratic mastery. A former mayor of Hamburg, Scholz led his party to victory in last year’s election by leaning into the Hanseatic reputation for quiet competence, prudence, and composure. In Berlin last week, German officials and observers described the speech to me as a moment in time rather than a shift in course. For a brief moment, a dramatic shift seemed in the offing.Īlas, the shift has not come to pass. Scholz had taken the initiative without consulting anyone other than his finance minister, flooring even senior members of his own Social Democratic Party, which has a long record advocating for appeasing Russia. In one speech, he overturned not only decades of Russia policy but also German restraint and pacifism in security and defense. The country, Scholz announced, would immediately start rebuilding its military, supplying Ukraine with weapons, and eliminating its energy dependence on Russia. So were Germany watchers around the world. When German Chancellor Olaf Scholz stood before his country’s parliament in the first days after the Russian invasion of Ukraine and announced a Zeitenwende-or turn of an era-in German foreign policy, his country was agog.
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